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Recently, I was totting up that over the past six years, I have worked in more than 20 countries spread over a number of continents Not all of these were places where I was running Executive Protection (EP) details, some were exercises in Risk & Crisis Analysis. The very fact that one is having to provide security advice or physical cover for visiting senior executives, assumes that the geography itself has inherent dangers. This is usually the case with many Third World environments where a combination of poverty, corruption, organised and disorganised crime, makes operating conditions for Western multi-national organisations fraught with difficulties and sometimes danger.

However, it often isn't necessary for the environment to be threatening for companies and their senior people to require advice and protection. Out of those sixteen countries worked in, a number have been such places as France, Germany and Italy, where factory closures and labour disputes have required the implementation of emergency security procedures, often requiring very, very low profile personal protection or the establishment of quick reaction teams. Our profile is so low on these occasions that we operate invisibly, as the slightest inclination by the workers that their bosses didn't trust them not to cause physical harm could prove disastrous.

I want to make the distinction early on about the world of bodyguarding in general and the work of Executive Protection in particular. I don't recognise much of what is written about the industry. Going about equipped with a range of concealed weaponry, handcuffs, specially designed suits to conceal a range of other covert kit and talking about working in the anti-Russian mafia industry smacks more of Walter Mitty than the world of corporate security that I've been engaged in for many years.
In the EP world, the job is about management, logistics, detailed planning, detailed advance work and the ability to operate amongst the most senior people of international business, without intrusion to them, or by your actions drawing any attention to them. The 'shoot 'em up' world of the make-believe BG or BG training school is a universe away from the reality of such work. Don't get me wrong, competence in a comprehensive range of combative skills, both armed and unarmed, is essential and maintenance of those skills a necessity, but in terms of importance in corporate security, they come well down the list.

There may be certain places in the world where, given the potential level of threat, a protective detail may need to be armed, but the people who are will be the indigenous security personnel who have been recruited as drivers or escort team members. Often they will be off-duty policemen licensed to carry. It is the height of stupidity to carry a weapon in a foreign country, irrespective of who has authorised it, as the person who jails you for carrying one may have more authority than the one who approved it. More importantly, as you are likely to be acting in the role of personal bodyguard to your principal, your job is not to fight or exchange fire, it is solely to get your boss out of danger.
Most EP details follow a similar formula. The Chief Executive of a multi-national operation, probably American in origin, is making a trip to one or more countries to visit his company's operations there. The individual whilst in the States carries no threat, however, the combination of the Third World environment, anti-U.S. sentiment and the profile of the visit may conspire to convince the company's legal council that a risk exists, and a straight line needs to be put under the potential corporate risk.

The company's head of security will be charged with organising the operation, although he will do this at arm's length, by contracting in an agency he has used before and who themselves have a network of international links, through which local manpower and material can be supplied. The reality is that often all that is required from the U.K. is one operator, or possibly two, who will carry out all the planning, liaison work and, ultimately, act as personal bodyguard to the principal. In any foreign country you need local drivers and people who are familiar with getting the best out of the environment.
The initial brief will be just that - brief - and is likely to contain little more than the dates (which invariably change), places to be visited (which will change), personnel who will travel from the company (which may change) and what resources the Security Director feels will be appropriate (which will change).

In the text book world of EP work, the task from here would be the Security Advances, which is the detailed planning and pre-visits that go into any travel arrangements. As with any operation, Advances are budget driven, but if the threat demands and budget is no deterrent then, formally, the stages are as follows:-

Pre-advances (planning stage)

  • Trip advances (finalise arrangements)
  • Visit advances (immediately before the party arrives)

The goal of the above is:-

  • To avoid all surprises
  • Planned contingencies
  • Avoid hazards and vulnerable situations


In reality, there are very few regions where our company does not have some familiarity, or where we do not have suitable people who we know have both manpower and resources and the very best of political, administration and official security connections. On a job in Azerbaijan a couple of years ago, our local security guy was able to get the corporate jet to park in the President's slot at Baku airport.

So it is likely we will combine stages 2 and 3 above and, if we know the country well, it may mean that the advance work can be done in only two days, immediately prior to the arrival. If the venue is unknown and conditions and resources likely to be difficult at source, then longer is needed and you may need a week on the ground. You will still not get the luxury though of two advance trips, given the sheer cost of air flights. This was the case in Kazakhstan some years back, where, with a whole week I was only just able to arrange affairs so that I had the remotest level of confidence that the job would work. This was for a visit of a little over 24 hours. The boss arrived in his 727 on Sunday at about 1400hrs and was gone by 1600hrs the next day.

This job was typical of one, which takes place in regions of few resources, and little or no idea of Western standards or expectations. I looked at probably 12 - 14 vehicles before I found the ones we needed which were remotely suitable. Even then the stretched limo you can see in the accompanying photo, blew its engine on a long, unplanned and steep mountainous climb. This necessitated transferring the boss to the Kazak Oil Minister's vehicle, on an icy road in the middle of nowhere, with a boss who was not in the best of health. Again, typically, the detail planning of the places to be visited and that we had recced, went completely out of the window, as the minister and his cronies essentially hijacked the convoy and diverted it, first to an unfinished shopping centre, and then by over 20 kilometres to an unfinished ski resort in the mountains, both of which they wanted the principal to invest money in so they could get them finished.


Going back to the text book requirements, the object of the advance is as follows:-

  • To arrange all accommodation
  • Transport arrangements
  • Special event arrangements
  • Security/Police liaison
  • Assessment of emergency/evacuation services
  • Public relations during all of the above

Always remember that in this preparation stage you have a trade-off in the conflict of having to disclose the identify of your VIP. Often you will not get the best of what is available, particularly with hotels, unless they believe that the person coming is truly a VIP If the company you are working for has an operation on the ground, you will be working in close liaison with them, which in the majority of cases will be a positive experience. On occasions, however, their imperatives in organising affairs can be in direct conflict with our requirements, both in terms of security and also in what is possible to achieve in a trip of only a few days. We know from bitter experience that we need to be firm, to the point of taking matters our of local corporate hands if they are completely at a tangent.

The Advance evolves as follows:-

  • Pre-departure preparations
  • Initial duties on arrival
  • Transportation arrangements
  • Site surveys and route recces
  • Emergency services

We do not have enough space here to go into the fine detail of the work which goes into the 5 areas above, save to give an overview, but all the fine detail is available in 'The Modern Bodyguard'. I wrote this book to do two things, first to accumulate all the formal pro-active procedures and reactive drills that have been developed over many years, but second, and more importantly, to show clearly how to amend and adapt these procedures to the real world; where time constraints, budgets, lack of resources and client imperatives have far more impact on how we are able to do the job than the threat ever does.

With the Pre-Departure Plans we have 3 broad areas of world to do:-

Collect Information - itineraries, dates, times, type of visit etc. Numbers in party, names and details, special VIP requirements, special medical requirements, proposed transportation and accommodation, Prelim Threat Assessment and threat category, visa requirements, immunisation needs, language, account billing, etc.

Contacts by Telephone - Corporate, either multi-national or local, security company. Accommodation - hotel or residence. Transportation - ground, air or other. Police/Security and the Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy or the Chief Security Officer at the British Embassy. Vehicle rental, etc.

Your should endeavour to make as many appointments by phone before you leave with all of the above, or at best get the names of the people you will need to see when you get on the ground. Remember that in many Third World countries it will prove more difficult to speak to the RSO on a local land line, when he may be only one mile from your hotel, than it is to speak internationally when you are over two thousand miles away, so if you know the local communications infrastructure is naff, then make the appointments from the U.K.

Plan itinerary for the Advance:-

  • Prioritise your tasks - time/threat
  • Prepare your Survey Itinerary - Hotel etc.
  • Prepare a checklist of all your questions, queries, intelligence required etc.

The above is only a very sketchy outline of the tasks in one area of Advance work and limited. The other four areas are the meat of good advance work and again, they are given in detail in 'The Modern Bodyguard'. What I would say here, from bitter experience, is never, never believe anything anyone tells you about how something will happen, without interrogating people in detail about the procedure. In Russia and other far flung countries, people will tell you what they think you want to hear as an answer to a question and, more critically, will give you any answer to a question, knowing full well that whenever it doesn't work, they won't be on duty anyway.

The Kazakhstan job was again classic as an example of this. Given the very high-level nature of the visit, we had arranged approval to take all the vehicles airside, at Almaty airport, (practically unheard of) and they would allow the vehicles to draw up to the plane after it had taxied, complete immigration and customs procedures on the plane (completely unheard of) and then the whole convoy would drive out of the airport without any transfers to vehicles at the terminal, as would be the case normally.

The problem, however, was ensuring that; 1. the security guard who would be on duty at the date at the time knew this was to happen and 2. he would actually have the key to perform this simple but critical task. Only through bitter experience of how such a basic and, one would assume, relatively unimportant function can go wrong, was I not prepared to accept anyone's word about how it would happen - even though the person who was reassuring me was the head of airport security.

He reached a point of infuriation about my not simply accepting that someone would open the gate when we arrived, but as it transpired when we did dig into the procedure in detail, there was no procedure in place to brief the guard who would be on duty and, more importantly, the guard in question was new and didn't know where the key was kept.

You may think that such detail is unnecessary, but let me assure you it isn't. The next day when the plane landed, we drove the cars out to the plane. Kazakhstan border guards entered the plane with customs and immigration as planned and then nothing. We waited and waited and still nothing and despite enquiries as to the reason for the delay, we got no suitable answer. All the good work that had gone into the planning was being lost, as the boss sat and fumed on the plane. Eventually, they had the courage to tell me what had caused the delay. One of the customs people was off-duty and he had locked the inkpad that they needed to ink the stamp for the passports in his desk - and you thought I was paranoid about the key!

By contrast there are jobs, mainly in Europe to be fair, which go off without a hitch, but it is because we leave no stone unturned in brainstorming what could go wrong, however remote, and then putting in place a contingency arrangement. It is the contingency planning that is so critical.

Doing a route recce in Madrid on a Sunday gives no impression as to what traffic is going to be like on Monday at 0830hrs. The photos show the problem. We recced a de-bus at a bank on a Sunday, but on the Monday we had to do the de-bus in the middle of a very busy street, with cars parked two deep. Fortunately, we had anticipated how it would be, and were prepared.

Kit

There is only one rule: Keep it Light! Over the years I've tried every combination of luggage and personal kit, but I'm no happier with the result than I was years ago.

I travel casually, even in Club Class, preferring to carry suits and jackets in a suit carrier. I would hope to get them on the plane with a carry-on bag, but it may be that the carrier will be consigned to the hold. For any EP work that will be longer than just a couple of days, and with the advance work, this will be unlikely I travel with a smallish suitcase, a suit carrier and soft black nylon holdall, which goes on board with me.

For a couple of days, I'll try and dispense with the suitcase, but this means that I'll be unable to take any gym kit with me, which I find difficult. Its difficult on an EP detail that lasts a few days to get away with one suit and I'll probably take two plus a jacket, two pairs of casual trousers and an assortment of shirts and tops. The black holdall will be with me when we are in the vehicles and I may have to take abroad a sizeable first aid kit.

The more remote the region the more problems you face as, ideally, you would wish to travel very light and consign nothing to the hold, but when you get to the hotel you may find that laundry and dry cleaning arrangements are non-existent, unlike in most Western chain hotels. If you know a hotel has a good service then you can cut back on a lot of shirts and even a suit.

The less you take, the less you have to lose. I've had luggage go astray a few times, but only once on an outward trip when it went astray in transit from Cyprus to Israel. It took 3 days to reach me in Tel Aviv, but fortunately, the job was not an EP one and I could get away with replacing some casual gear. If I am on a very tight deadline for the advance and would have no time to replace lost clothes, I will travel in a suit, just in case.

Personal Security

Your own security doesn't just start when the boss steps off the plane. If you are going out to do the Advance work you too are at risk the moment you leave the Arrivals Hall. To someone with criminal intent, you are simply another Westerner with too much money and too little sense. If possible, get your local security people to arrange the VIP facilities for you and to meet you there. This tests their capabilities in this area and gives you the opportunity to see how things are organised and arranged. You are as much at risk as the next person if you are left stranded at a potentially hostile airport.

You should be switching on at all times and be gathering a comprehensive, situational appraisal of everything that is going on around you. Often this is completely at odds with what you are being told. The worst people for doing this are usually the company's local management. They have always played down any socio-political problems to corporate HQ and usually also manage to hide from them the fact that they are being threatened, extorted, have Russian mafia partners, and have employees planted by organised crime groups. They will also have told HQ that no outside security is necessary and that their country is one of the most peaceful in the world. They are paranoid you will say anything different than the local party line and worry everyone at head office into some reactionary activity - like closing the operation down. Often, because of this, they may be very anti your activities and I've learned to accept their co-operation as a bonus, not something we actually need.

So you need to be able to sense for yourself how the land really lies, as much for your on safety as for your people.

FORTHCOMING

Travel Security from the point of view of the business executive, who may not always enjoy the personal protection of a close protection operative.