Self Defence & Security - Articles - Self Defence Part 1

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SELF DEFENCE - Part One

Writing an article on self defence is like writing an article on shoot - its impossible to do it any justice unless you have the space of an encyclopaedia. So where do we start and from what perspective or perspectives do we approach such a vast subject. In both shooting and self defence, we can draw some broad similarities which may help us drive a small wedge into the subject and open it up for discussion.

In simplistic terms, we say shooting is broadly one of two things - that is, it is either Offensive or Defensive. We can then 'lump' weapons and tactics into these two broad divisions and make the subject some what easier to digest. We talk about 'assault' rifles (offensive) and handguns for personal protection (defensive) and the tactics we then employ in either case are those forged by the demands of these basic roles, taking into account such considerations as weapon limitations and effectiveness of them to operate within these two arenas. The problem occurs where one arena overlaps the other.

Handguns, from a military point of view, have always enjoyed a secondary role to the main purpose of principal weapons systems, such as those designed for the battlefield. One only has to look at the struggle which took place to have semi-auto pistols accepted by the American Military in the early part of this century to see how confused was the thinking on the requirement for a 'personal weapon of protection' as handguns were called. Hand in hand with the battle over the merits of revolver or pistol went the battle about training and even with the enhanced firepower of pistols, training was still conditioned by the 'Principles of Marksmanship' which dogged any practical approach to pistol work for nearly two world wars, with some notable exceptions.

Self defence systems in the military have received no less a confused approach. Often, the very term 'Self Defence' determines what people feel should be taught and often this results in a worthless, ineffective, dangerous (to the user) collection of techniques that have no place in a dangerous world. The problem is always the fact that by definition, 'Defence' - implies waiting to react before responding to an attack. The intimacy of electronic news gathering at nearly every conflict around the world has had the effect that every authority, be they police or military, has as much a consideration to adverse publicity during conflicts as they do to giving their people effective combat techniques. Combative techniques cannot be 'politically correct' and effective at the same time.

Many years ago, I began using the term 'Self Protection' to free up the thinking and to acceptably allow pre-emptive strikes to form the basis of my Close Combat teaching. If we are looking, however, for a suitable heading to describe the whole of what we want, then Unarmed Combat becomes reasonably apt. The term does not condition us to approach the subject with any particular mental limitations and allows for free reign of techniques, both defensive and offensive. My own problem with the head of 'Unarmed Combat' is that we are actually seldom unarmed, even when walking down the street, as we are likely to be carrying pens, keys, matchbox, brolley, magazine and loose change, all of which make good improvised weapons. Therefore, if we free people from the thinking about 'Empty Hand' concept, we then remove the constraints which restrict us from thinking about a range of natural weapons which can be brought into play, should occasion demand.

I feel we get even closer to the reality if we could call it 'Personal Combat'. I avoid the term 'Close Quarter Battle' (CQB), as this, in military terms is weapons oriented, although, as we know, the battle is likely to be in an environment which places the enemy close by and in a variety of concealed locations from which they must be prised out - usually a 'built up area'. The ideal term which I feel is most appropriate is 'Close Quarter Combat' (CQC). It is suitably vague to allow in whatever is appropriate at the time to suit the demands placed on those who need to learn, such as armed or unarmed techniques and in military personal combat training, these demands have quite clearly seen to pendulum in sync with the background of the state of the nation i.e. at peace or at war.

At present, my personal belief is that no branch of the military should be happy with their unarmed combat syllabus, but it politically suits the times. Videos I've watched and manuals I've studied, all reflect the current imperative for a 'defensive' posture to be the premise from which a syllabus has had to be designed.

You would need look no further than the 'committee designed' army Restraint and Arrest manual. Essentially, an adaptation of the Restraint Arrest and Control System (RACS), developed by the army in co-operation with the Army School of Physical Training, the Metropolitan Police and HM Customs & Excise. By its own admission, the syllabus was developed in 1970, primarily to meet the army's peace-keeping role in Northern Ireland. "The aim of the course is to give the solider effective, but humane skills, whilst observing the principle of minimum force consistent with achieving the objectives". In other words, it won't work, but the authorities can say they have one and it is hard to dispute that it is effective. Its aims are broadly at odds with its objectives and personal, bitter experience has taught me that the 'supposed' attacks and holds perpetrated by the illustrated attackers, bear no resemblance whatsoever to how it happens in the real world. It is dangerous, fallacious and misleading to train people in the belief that these will work for only one person against real attacks.

With excuses for dropping into the vernacular, its complete bollocks to believe that someone, in reality, who dives towards you with short, fast, slashing strokes of a knife, can have his wrist gripped, twisted, locked and then thrown to the ground and disarmed. When you look at the diagrams in Control & Restraint, however, the attackers are frozen into immobility for some 2 - 3 seconds after he has committed his arm for one thrust of the knife at what must have been a pedestrian pace - bollocks I say again - its not reality.

Capt. Stephen Stavers USMC, who was killed in 1944 during the marine landings at Peleliu, was a personal combat instructor and a student of Col. Biddle, who many will know from his somewhat classical work on the subject of combat knife fighting. Stavers commented on knife defence - he said (and knew) "that no bare-handed disarming technique is dependable against even a fair knife fighter. Trying to disarm a truly scientific knife fighter would be like trying to stop a propeller with bare hands". He went on to say "indeed, the appearance of the scientific knife fighter in action suggests a flashing propeller on the head of a cobra, to use an extravagant metaphor, he uses a slashing attack (rather than thrusting or stabbing), with the knife pointing forward in a loose, flexible manner, the blade flat and the cutting edge outward. The blade is in constant, controlled, lateral motion at the same time, moving in and out, high and low".

The above is the reality of it, not how you see it portrayed in training manuals or martial arts magazines. The myth is perpetuated by people who don't know - but assume. To be fair to the Army's Physical Training Wing, if commended to produce a manual - you do. This particular work, however, is no better and no worse than any other personal combat syllabus designed in peace-time than it is when your country is at war - its just an image problem and we come back to the necessity of authorities to protect themselves and also to limit what they know will eventually be in the hands of a civilian population. During World War 2, FBI agents trained alongside the first combined special forces of the American and Canadian units, so that they knew what the soldiers knew. The purpose of this was so they had equal combative skills when these men returned to civilian life and would possibly use their skills for more nefarious ends.

Contrast today's training with what we knew 80 years ago when a man called William Ewatt Fairbairn walked the streets of Shanghai. As an underage recruit, Fairbairn had joined the Royal Marine's Light Infantry and in 1903 volunteered for duty with the British Legation Guard at Seoul, Korea. In October that year, he sailed for the Far East to begin an association with the Orient which was to last until the late 1930s. Her arrived in Korea in 1904, a few days before the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese war and some seven years later, bought his discharge and signed up as a constable in the Shanghai Municipal Police.

The International Settlement, in Shanghai, for whose safety, the SMP was responsible, was unquestionably, at that time, the single most lawless place in the world, with acts of crime and terrorism running at epidemic levels. Organised gangs of professional kidnappers roamed the streets armed with the latest in full and semi-auto weapons and when caught, would use them. Conditions in which the police fought were the filthy, tightly packed, poorly lit, overcrowded maze of Chinese buildings, against Chinese, Korean and Japanese gangsters skilled in a variety of Martial Arts and the use of weapons. The Queensbury rules and 'principles of marksmanship' proved totally ineffective in combating such violence.

Fairbairn, with others, developed combat concepts and training systems for pistol, knife, stick and unarmed combat that, due to its success, was to eventually find its way into all Commando training and for training the special operations people in the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) and the American OSS (Office of Strategic Service) during the second world war as well as the American Marine Corp. It was Fairbairn who thought of the first 'Killing House' or 'Mystery House' as it was called then. The system that formed the foundation of their close combat was Defendu, the methods that had been taught to members of the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) and used to battle with the street gangs, thugs, toughs, kidnappers and what have you that plagued the International Settlement of Shanghai. One of the largest criminal organisations that the world has seen, plied their trade there. It was known as the Green Gang and it is said that it had anywhere up to 100,000 members, in and around the Shanghai area.

Defendu had been formulated and developed by W.E. Fairbairn from his training in Shinnoshindo-Ryu Ju-Jitsu and his later training in Kodokan judo. As well as these Japanese arts, he also had a knowledge of wrestling, western boxing, Savate, Chinese boxing and general brawling methods used by a number of nationalities that resided in or visited Shanghai. Add to this a study of the techniques used by the United States Marine Corps, who had one of their regiments stationed there from 1927 until 1942 and you will see a great depth of knowledge gained by Fairbairn on all aspects of close combat, both armed and unarmed.

All the methods espoused in Defendu had been used by Fairbairn and members of the SMP. The real test came in 1925 with the formation of what was officially known as the Reserve Unit but better known as the Shanghai Riot Squad. So it was from 1925 through to 1935, Fairbairn trained, inspired and led the squad in all its various duties. This covered street disturbances and riots, armed robberies, kidnapping, hostage taking, siege situations and a variety of bodyguarding duties. Until his retirement at 55 years old, he took every opportunity to ride out with his men on emergency calls. To illustrate this - he retired at the end of February 1940 and yet in the early part of the month, he was at siege, where his unit had been sent to assist the local station in which an armed gang had taken refuge and prisoners in a residential area.

It would have been enough of a life for most people up to this point, but we now enter really the third part of an incredible life. In 1940, both he and E.A. (Bill) Sykes, his partner in crime from the SMP, who commanded the sniper unit, spent the war as Instructors to Instructors for a variety of special forces and commando units, both British, American and Canadian, as well as the collection of foreign operatives who passed through such establishments as Inverailort House, at Lochailort in Scotland or the Commando Basic Training Centre (CBTC) at Achnacarry House some 20 miles away. This article, cannot devote itself to the history of these men or their exploits and the forthcoming book by an old friend and martial arts colleague, Peter Robins, on this truly fascinating period of history and the Fairbairn-Sykes line will satisfy this near forgotten piece of military history and the story that needs to be told. What did emerge from these men was a combat system which has, for many, remained unequalled. They produced techniques that worked against men versed in violence and death.

As we know, Fairbairn took every opportunity to accompany as many patrols and call-outs so as to be able to assess under fire and in combat, the reactions of himself and his men. He knew what worked in the fear, stress, terror and the reality of a gunfight and he adopted and developed personal combat skills to suit. These reached their peak in his 'Silent Killing Course' delivered at Lochailort and elsewhere during the war years.

Peter Robins once wrote in an article how little development work there was when one looked at Fairbairn's writings in his books - Defendu 1926 Scientific Self Defence 1931 and finally, Get Tough. This wasn't by way of criticism, but an observation about how few things actually worked in real combat and about the simplicity of techniques which are required. As the only genuine teacher of Defendu in Britain, and with nearly 30 years martial arts experience, Peter is more than qualified to comment on the role of martial arts in self defence. The following is an extract from an article he wrote for the internal newsletter of The British Combat Association.

Thoughts on Self Protection and Martial Arts
By Peter Robins

"It is indeed a sad reflection on the martial arts today that so much of their original base in effective combat techniques have been sacrificed and or lost in the myriad systems that have evolved since the mass influx of these arts into the West.

This is not to write all these arts off, one cannot do this as there is always the exception to the rule, but the rule seems to be that hundreds of new systems and styles have been brought into being in the last twenty years or so. The '60s and '70s saw the mainstream systems, predominantly Japanese Karate, grow and flourish. Gradually there began a break up and split away of individuals and groups to found their own organisations. No big problem there, but many of these individuals and groups had little understanding of their original system. Certainly in many cases, nowhere near enough knowledge to go off and develop their own system - style, yes, but actual system?

What happened was that in many instances, the old adage 'a little learning is a dangerous thing', was again proved true. Judged from a sporting aspect, this break up was no big problem really. Judged today from a self protection point of view, it was a disaster. What we are left with is very often a hotch-potch of sporting/competition moves, presented as a coherent and sound method of self defence. Or a collection of pseudo combat moves that are supposed to bear some notion of reality. With some exceptions, nothing could be further from the truth.

In too many cases we are left with a motley collection of moves that in content, distance, speed, timing, balance, power, tactically and strategically would only work against an idiot moving at half speed. This is fine for demonstration purposes and within the confines of a dojo/training hall or someone's own little mind cum fantasy world. If this is where it stayed, there would be little harm done. But it does not. For many years now, these kind of techniques have been presented as a kind of mystical and magical potion to an unsuspecting public. It would be marvellous to be able to say that the type of training as described above would stand one in good stead in a bad situation. Perhaps many years ago it did, when few people knew better. Most attackers twenty years ago, on seeing what they perceived as any kind of martial arts prowess, would have run a mile. Not so today. The bubble has burst. The dream has faded.

So where did it go wrong? At the risk of being clever about this perplexing question, these thoughts come to mind:-

I feel we get even closer to the reality if we could call it 'Personal Combat'. I avoid the term 'Close Quarter Battle' (CQB), as this, in military terms is weapons oriented, although, as we know, the battle is likely to be in an environment which places the enemy close by and in a variety of concealed locations from which they must be prised out - usually a 'built up area'. The ideal term which I feel is most appropriate is 'Close Quarter Combat' (CQC). It is suitably vague to allow in whatever is appropriate at the time to suit the demands placed on those who need to learn, such as armed or unarmed techniques and in military personal combat training, these demands have quite clearly seen to pendulum in sync with the background of the state of the nation i.e. at peace or at war.

At present, my personal belief is that no branch of the military should be happy with their unarmed combat syllabus, but it politically suits the times. Videos I've watched and manuals I've studied, all reflect the current imperative for a 'defensive' posture to be the premise from which a syllabus has had to be designed.

You would need look no further than the 'committee designed' army Restraint and Arrest manual. Essentially, an adaptation of the Restraint Arrest and Control System (RACS), developed by the army in co-operation with the Army School of Physical Training, the Metropolitan Police and HM Customs & Excise. By its own admission, the syllabus was developed in 1970, primarily to meet the army's peace-keeping role in Northern Ireland. "The aim of the course is to give the solider effective, but humane skills, whilst observing the principle of minimum force consistent with achieving the objectives". In other words, it won't work, but the authorities can say they have one and it is hard to dispute that it is effective. Its aims are broadly at odds with its objectives and personal, bitter experience has taught me that the 'supposed' attacks and holds perpetrated by the illustrated attackers, bear no resemblance whatsoever to how it happens in the real world. It is dangerous, fallacious and misleading to train people in the belief that these will work for only one person against real attacks.

With excuses for dropping into the vernacular, its complete bollocks to believe that someone, in reality, who dives towards you with short, fast, slashing strokes of a knife, can have his wrist gripped, twisted, locked and then thrown to the ground and disarmed. When you look at the diagrams in Control & Restraint, however, the attackers are frozen into immobility for some 2 - 3 seconds after he has committed his arm for one thrust of the knife at what must have been a pedestrian pace - bollocks I say again - its not reality.

Capt. Stephen Stavers USMC, who was killed in 1944 during the marine landings at Peleliu, was a personal combat instructor and a student of Col. Biddle, who many will know from his somewhat classical work on the subject of combat knife fighting. Stavers commented on knife defence - he said (and knew) "that no bare-handed disarming technique is dependable against even a fair knife fighter. Trying to disarm a truly scientific knife fighter would be like trying to stop a propeller with bare hands". He went on to say "indeed, the appearance of the scientific knife fighter in action suggests a flashing propeller on the head of a cobra, to use an extravagant metaphor, he uses a slashing attack (rather than thrusting or stabbing), with the knife pointing forward in a loose, flexible manner, the blade flat and the cutting edge outward. The blade is in constant, controlled, lateral motion at the same time, moving in and out, high and low".

The above is the reality of it, not how you see it portrayed in training manuals or martial arts magazines. The myth is perpetuated by people who don't know - but assume. To be fair to the Army's Physical Training Wing, if commended to produce a manual - you do. This particular work, however, is no better and no worse than any other personal combat syllabus designed in peace-time than it is when your country is at war - its just an image problem and we come back to the necessity of authorities to protect themselves and also to limit what they know will eventually be in the hands of a civilian population. During World War 2, FBI agents trained alongside the first combined special forces of the American and Canadian units, so that they knew what the soldiers knew. The purpose of this was so they had equal combative skills when these men returned to civilian life and would possibly use their skills for more nefarious ends.

Contrast today's training with what we knew 80 years ago when a man called William Ewatt Fairbairn walked the streets of Shanghai. As an underage recruit, Fairbairn had joined the Royal Marine's Light Infantry and in 1903 volunteered for duty with the British Legation Guard at Seoul, Korea. In October that year, he sailed for the Far East to begin an association with the Orient which was to last until the late 1930s. Her arrived in Korea in 1904, a few days before the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese war and some seven years later, bought his discharge and signed up as a constable in the Shanghai Municipal Police.

The International Settlement, in Shanghai, for whose safety, the SMP was responsible, was unquestionably, at that time, the single most lawless place in the world, with acts of crime and terrorism running at epidemic levels. Organised gangs of professional kidnappers roamed the streets armed with the latest in full and semi-auto weapons and when caught, would use them. Conditions in which the police fought were the filthy, tightly packed, poorly lit, overcrowded maze of Chinese buildings, against Chinese, Korean and Japanese gangsters skilled in a variety of Martial Arts and the use of weapons. The Queensbury rules and 'principles of marksmanship' proved totally ineffective in combating such violence.

Fairbairn, with others, developed combat concepts and training systems for pistol, knife, stick and unarmed combat that, due to its success, was to eventually find its way into all Commando training and for training the special operations people in the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) and the American OSS (Office of Strategic Service) during the second world war as well as the American Marine Corp. It was Fairbairn who thought of the first 'Killing House' or 'Mystery House' as it was called then. The system that formed the foundation of their close combat was Defendu, the methods that had been taught to members of the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) and used to battle with the street gangs, thugs, toughs, kidnappers and what have you that plagued the International Settlement of Shanghai. One of the largest criminal organisations that the world has seen, plied their trade there. It was known as the Green Gang and it is said that it had anywhere up to 100,000 members, in and around the Shanghai area.

Defendu had been formulated and developed by W.E. Fairbairn from his training in Shinnoshindo-Ryu Ju-Jitsu and his later training in Kodokan judo. As well as these Japanese arts, he also had a knowledge of wrestling, western boxing, Savate, Chinese boxing and general brawling methods used by a number of nationalities that resided in or visited Shanghai. Add to this a study of the techniques used by the United States Marine Corps, who had one of their regiments stationed there from 1927 until 1942 and you will see a great depth of knowledge gained by Fairbairn on all aspects of close combat, both armed and unarmed.

All the methods espoused in Defendu had been used by Fairbairn and members of the SMP. The real test came in 1925 with the formation of what was officially known as the Reserve Unit but better known as the Shanghai Riot Squad. So it was from 1925 through to 1935, Fairbairn trained, inspired and led the squad in all its various duties. This covered street disturbances and riots, armed robberies, kidnapping, hostage taking, siege situations and a variety of bodyguarding duties. Until his retirement at 55 years old, he took every opportunity to ride out with his men on emergency calls. To illustrate this - he retired at the end of February 1940 and yet in the early part of the month, he was at siege, where his unit had been sent to assist the local station in which an armed gang had taken refuge and prisoners in a residential area.

It would have been enough of a life for most people up to this point, but we now enter really the third part of an incredible life. In 1940, both he and E.A. (Bill) Sykes, his partner in crime from the SMP, who commanded the sniper unit, spent the war as Instructors to Instructors for a variety of special forces and commando units, both British, American and Canadian, as well as the collection of foreign operatives who passed through such establishments as Inverailort House, at Lochailort in Scotland or the Commando Basic Training Centre (CBTC) at Achnacarry House some 20 miles away. This article, cannot devote itself to the history of these men or their exploits and the forthcoming book by an old friend and martial arts colleague, Peter Robins, on this truly fascinating period of history and the Fairbairn-Sykes line will satisfy this near forgotten piece of military history and the story that needs to be told. What did emerge from these men was a combat system which has, for many, remained unequalled. They produced techniques that worked against men versed in violence and death.

As we know, Fairbairn took every opportunity to accompany as many patrols and call-outs so as to be able to assess under fire and in combat, the reactions of himself and his men. He knew what worked in the fear, stress, terror and the reality of a gunfight and he adopted and developed personal combat skills to suit. These reached their peak in his 'Silent Killing Course' delivered at Lochailort and elsewhere during the war years.

Peter Robins once wrote in an article how little development work there was when one looked at Fairbairn's writings in his books - Defendu 1926 Scientific Self Defence 1931 and finally, Get Tough. This wasn't by way of criticism, but an observation about how few things actually worked in real combat and about the simplicity of techniques which are required. As the only genuine teacher of Defendu in Britain, and with nearly 30 years martial arts experience, Peter is more than qualified to comment on the role of martial arts in self defence. The following is an extract from an article he wrote for the internal newsletter of The British Combat Association.

Thoughts on Self Protection and Martial Arts
By Peter Robins

"It is indeed a sad reflection on the martial arts today that so much of their original base in effective combat techniques have been sacrificed and or lost in the myriad systems that have evolved since the mass influx of these arts into the West.

This is not to write all these arts off, one cannot do this as there is always the exception to the rule, but the rule seems to be that hundreds of new systems and styles have been brought into being in the last twenty years or so. The '60s and '70s saw the mainstream systems, predominantly Japanese Karate, grow and flourish. Gradually there began a break up and split away of individuals and groups to found their own organisations. No big problem there, but many of these individuals and groups had little understanding of their original system. Certainly in many cases, nowhere near enough knowledge to go off and develop their own system - style, yes, but actual system?

What happened was that in many instances, the old adage 'a little learning is a dangerous thing', was again proved true. Judged from a sporting aspect, this break up was no big problem really. Judged today from a self protection point of view, it was a disaster. What we are left with is very often a hotch-potch of sporting/competition moves, presented as a coherent and sound method of self defence. Or a collection of pseudo combat moves that are supposed to bear some notion of reality. With some exceptions, nothing could be further from the truth.

In too many cases we are left with a motley collection of moves that in content, distance, speed, timing, balance, power, tactically and strategically would only work against an idiot moving at half speed. This is fine for demonstration purposes and within the confines of a dojo/training hall or someone's own little mind cum fantasy world. If this is where it stayed, there would be little harm done. But it does not. For many years now, these kind of techniques have been presented as a kind of mystical and magical potion to an unsuspecting public. It would be marvellous to be able to say that the type of training as described above would stand one in good stead in a bad situation. Perhaps many years ago it did, when few people knew better. Most attackers twenty years ago, on seeing what they perceived as any kind of martial arts prowess, would have run a mile. Not so today. The bubble has burst. The dream has faded.

So where did it go wrong? At the risk of being clever about this perplexing question, these thoughts come to mind:-

  • The myth was sold that all and any martial arts training was effective.
  • The myth was sold that a black belt automatically meant that you have become an instructor, when all it really meant was that the recipient had gained a certain level in training.
  • The myth was sold that gaining in knowledge and becoming effective meant
  • learning more weird and wonderful moves as you progressed.
  • The myth was sold that all martial arts had been tried and tested.

The list could go on, but we will stop there and state that this is enough to be going on with!

Pick up any martial arts magazine from the past few years and you will see words used in the text and advertisements that were never used before - words like, real, effective, practical, combat …..

This is not done just for editorial content. It does show that a problem has been recognised in regard to what has been passed off for self protection and what has often been a rather stylised dance or keep fit regime. Harsh words? Maybe so. I truly hope that anyone reading this can turn around and say - "that does not apply to me, I had a good instructor, one that knew what he was talking about at a practical level and made what he gave us a living art, not a dead artefact".

Consider this, you have been told that you are at war from tomorrow and that you have been given a group of people to train. They will be able to spend about a day or two with you learning some unarmed techniques, after that they will have to move on and take with them what you have been able to show them. They might very well have to use what you have been able to teach them in a real close combat situation ….. what would you teach them? Now you may say this sounds rather far-fetched, but travel back to the last war and that is more or less what instructors like Fairbairn & Sykes had to do.

Peter Robins advises that Fairbairn based his teaching of close combat on 3 principles:-

Surprise ---- Speed --- Retaining the Initiative

The first two are self-explanatory, the third perhaps not quite so. What he advocated was that once you decide you have to attack, then there is no let-up until the fight is over. The rationale was very aptly summed up by the CO at the Special Training Centre, Lochailort, in Western Scotland in July 1942 as follows:-

"To the civilian without a weapon, or the soldier surprised without his or deprived of it, it gives the necessary confidence, determination and ruthlessness to gain victory. It will soon be found that the principle value of the training lies not so much in the actual physical holds or breaks (and blows), but in the psychological reaction which engenders and fosters the necessary attitude of mind which refuses to admit defeat and is determined to achieve victory".

Starting from the STC, their methods spread wide and far, found their way into the Army, Navy, Royal Marines and RAF, to say nothing of the many special units that Great Britain formed. Some are well known, such as the Commandos, Independent Companies, Special Operations Executive (SOE), SAS, SBS, with their links extending to all United States and Canadian special forces and intelligence operations. Fairbairn taught such worthy notables in unconventional warfare as Spencer Chapman, Mike Calvert, Lord Lovat an both the Stirling brothers, not to mention Randolph Churchull and Ian Fleming.

Broadly, the foundation of a close combat system should be based on these precepts:-

  • Easy to present
  • Easy to understand
  • Easy to perform
  • Easy to retain under stress

To be accurate, the term 'relatively easy' should be substituted for easy, as no system will ever be that easy to put over in a combat situation, as the resultant stress induced sees to that. During his interviews with former CBTC instructors in his quest for information on the period, Peter Robins tells the story of his encounter with a 73 year old. They were talking about the wristlock, which if you look in Fairbairn's book, never seems a particularly dynamic technique. Peter's next recollection, however, was from his back as he looked up at the boot of this old man which was just inches from his face. He'd actually carried out an attack on Peter with the technique, put him down - with no compliance from Peter whatsoever - and as Peter tells the story, there was nothing he could have done about it.

What then became patently clear to Peter about the difference then and now, was that the philosophy of combat was based on attack. What Peter had perceived in the book as a passive defence, was in fact an attacking move and this has since been confirmed by numerous people who went through Lochailort as instructors. The imperatives of war demanded deadly, effective, pre-emptive action. Today, regrettably, it is wait, defend and die or suffer serious injury. Prior to Lochailort and the Fairbairn/Sykes influence, older instructors from the physical training wing, whose responsibility, hand to hand combat, had been confirmed that the whole emphasis had changed from Defence to Attack.

Any army manual for combat which has been contributed to by the Met and Customs & Excise, is not forged in either the heat of war or the necessity of survival, but coloured with the brush of political correctness and over-adherence to the laws of self defence. Watch any Sky television programme on American police to see the reality of personal combat. I watched the arrest, by hardened, experienced officers, of a drugged individual who had the potential to cause harm and injury. When eventually he was taken, it was by 5 to 6 officers and the two who first got there knew that they would be unable to subdue him on their own, without serious risk of personal injuries. It takes numbers of people to restrain someone who is only partially violent and those same officers would die laughing if they could look at how our British Control & Restraint training has been put together and sold to individual police and prison officers. Over the past few years however, this has all changed and a 'Wind of Change' is blowing through police training in the UK.

Attack was only ever the best means of defence - and remains so. Later we will look at techniques, but for the moment, we need to stay with some broad concepts of combat. It isn't actually the techniques which win the day, it's what behind them that count. The techniques are just the tip of the iceberg and to use an analogy, it wasn't what they could see of the iceberg that sank the Titanic, rather it was the large mass which went unseen below the waves. My approach to this has been through my own development of FRAME:

F actors

R ange

A ssessment

M ethod

E xecution

The above are headings which we will look and which contain the massive amount of data which we should have before we act in combat. These are not awareness factors, they are all the other things that regrettably we ignore or take for granted, but which have substantial influence of whether we have the whole picture and will succeed in our endeavour.

FACTORS
How dressed (you), terrain, footwear, lighting, natural weapon, escape routes, enemy territory, friendly forces (help), PURPOSE, witnesses. These are the 'situational' factors that are often ignored when combat techniques are shown in manuals. The typical military training video has 2 men squared off in a guard position, where one man has a weapon and the other looks suitably ready. To this day, I haven't a ----ing clue as to where the assailant was supposed to have appeared from, other than to assume he just materialised out of thin air.

Whilst all of the factors mentioned above require consideration, 'Purpose' demands a more detailed examination If, for example, you are a police officer, chasing on foot a known, violent felon, who was surprised during a hold-up and who took off, you would have no doubt in your mind as to your purpose - essentially, in this case, your purpose is your occupation. You might not verbally express it at the time, but it could be summarised as 'a desire to arrest the suspect', but probably a 'stronger desire to survive the experience'. You are in little doubt as to your purpose and you would be in little doubt as to the other's purpose if, during the chase, he had hidden and then without warning, sprang out in front of you, armed with a knife and attacked.

Contrast this with a civilian walking the same route when the same thing happens i.e. a person explodes from behind a street corner or doorway and attacks you with a knife. In this instance, his purpose is blindingly clear and yours less so - you have still to come to terms with your purpose, which, if you have the time to recover your surprise, should be to flee.

An even less clear distinction is in this scenario where, as you are walking along the same street, a person who you would describe as 'suspicious', emerges from a doorway, fixes his eyes on you and comes towards you with one hand seemingly holding something in his pocket. Now both his purpose and yours is completely unclear. You want to suspect the best not the worst, you will refrain from an attack to pre-empt the threatening situation and you will be caught still trying to make your assessment of the situation when he eventually closes and makes an attack. He may, of course, run past, take the change out of his pocket and jump on the bus he was looking at over your shoulder - paranoia or preparedness?

It doesn't really matter so long as you avoid the classic 'FREEZE' - this happens because of being surprised and being unable to determine your PURPOSE i.e. your role in what is happening around you.

RANGE
This section is very much 'AWARENESS' based. Awareness of risk or threat 'buys' time! - The further out we perceive a possible threat, the more time we have for our assessment and fight or flight. In 'The Modern Bodyguard', I've put some flesh on the bones of my principles of Self Protection, which is the Awareness Pyramid:-

AVOIDANCE

EVALUATION

AWARENESS

In this article, I don't want to re-visit this concept in depth, nor the 'action trigger' to substitute for decision-making, save to say the 'FRAME' commonly happens against a background of 'AWARENESS' - without it there is just shock, surprise and, as they say in the movies 'a world of pain'.

Under the heading of 'RANGE', we obviously take in the actual distance, but also closing speed, angle of approach and weapons range. Remember, an Olympic-standard sprinter is covering 100m in under 10 seconds - to cover 10m? - well work it out for yourself. For those readers who are familiar with 'Surviving Edged Weapons', you will know that the safe! 'control distance' for an armed officer to deal with a 'knife wielding' assailant is out to 21 feet - At 2.1 ft you're as good as cut - Act before.

ASSESSMENT
Opponent - size, build, aggressive, demeanour, body language, numbers, + the 3D's - drunk, drugged and dressed. Clothing can be like body armour - the more layers someone is wearing, the harder they are to hurt. A 20 stone, well built attacker, wearing a vest, 1 shirt, 1 woolly pully, a jacket and overcoat, who's had 12 pints of Guinness, is going to be hard to hurt with bodyshots!

ASSESSMENT = DECISION TIME
This is where PURPOSE should be clearly decided - both yours and his - don't remain under any doubt at this stage as to whether you have a problem or not - if in doubt Front Him or Turn and Get Out of There! You can't afford to wait until the distance is closed and he's on you.

METHOD
The psychology of conflict. The battle takes place well before any physical exchange. Simply making resolute eye contact can warn an intending mugger that you've seen him - once the element of surprise is lost, they will lose interest in you.

Method is also about 'acting'. You have a number of choices to make at this stage depending upon your assessment. You may be aware of one person, but muggers seldom come in ones. What can start as a 'one to one', can end up with you battling against 2 - 3. So - BE CERTAIN.

If conflict is inevitable, then you need to be a good poker player, as you may have to bluff, despite your inner feelings. You can exude aggression and even verbalise this in a torrent of powerful invective. If you're not up to that and you don't have a face like a robber's dog - (which helps with the bluff) - don't attempt it.

Better to appear afraid and incapable, which subterfuge can build over-confidence in your opponent and serve to draw him in to your most suitable and preferred range. You need to practise both these postures and the dialogue which goes with them - they both work and have for me on many occasions.

The aggressive approach will, however, seldom work on drunks, or people whose rational thinking is affected by drugs or a complete loss of self-control and anger. Their imagination, as to what will befall them, that you're so graphically describing, is lost on these people - though it can work well with the casual street 'encounter'.

EXECUTION

The Fight or Flight. Such facets as mental domination, attitude not to give up, the 'win' mentality, Action Triggers.

What you do if there is to be combat, do you punch, kick, throw, strangle, choke, lock or do you run?

For Execution, substitute Explosion, which is what you must do. It should be over in a split second. I teach 'Attack' - Wellington, when asked about his tactics in battle replied (with apologies for what he might actually have said) - "I have no tactics, I simply join the enemy and then decide what I'm going to do".

Distance - Dilutes! By this I mean that doing techniques at a distance dilutes power and impact. You must be close to your opponent to gain most effect from natural bodyweight put into techniques. The main features of Execution are the weapons as we have said hands! Feet! Combinations! Takedowns! Etc etc.

FRAME is just that - a Framework around which all aspects of a confrontation can be positioned and assessed. In Close Protection, for example, when we are in possession of all the facts about a job, we make an 'appreciation' and it's the same in CQC. It demands, at the risk of repetition, that you are constantly aware as to how all the factors under each heading are constantly changing - i.e. 'Situation Awareness' and how, as a consequence, our options and methods need to change.

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