|
SELF DEFENCE - Part One
|
| Writing
an article on self defence is like writing an article
on shoot - its impossible to do it any justice unless
you have the space of an encyclopaedia. So where do we
start and from what perspective or perspectives do we
approach such a vast subject. In both shooting and self
defence, we can draw some broad similarities which may
help us drive a small wedge into the subject and open
it up for discussion.
|
|
In simplistic
terms, we say shooting is broadly one of two things -
that is, it is either Offensive or Defensive. We can then
'lump' weapons and tactics into these two broad divisions
and make the subject some what easier to digest. We talk
about 'assault' rifles (offensive) and handguns for personal
protection (defensive) and the tactics we then employ
in either case are those forged by the demands of these
basic roles, taking into account such considerations as
weapon limitations and effectiveness of them to operate
within these two arenas. The problem occurs where one
arena overlaps the other.
|
|
Handguns, from a military point
of view, have always enjoyed a secondary role to the
main purpose of principal weapons systems, such as those
designed for the battlefield. One only has to look at
the struggle which took place to have semi-auto pistols
accepted by the American Military in the early part
of this century to see how confused was the thinking
on the requirement for a 'personal weapon of protection'
as handguns were called. Hand in hand with the battle
over the merits of revolver or pistol went the battle
about training and even with the enhanced firepower
of pistols, training was still conditioned by the 'Principles
of Marksmanship' which dogged any practical approach
to pistol work for nearly two world wars, with some
notable exceptions.
|
|
Self defence systems in the military
have received no less a confused approach. Often, the
very term 'Self Defence' determines what people feel
should be taught and often this results in a worthless,
ineffective, dangerous (to the user) collection of techniques
that have no place in a dangerous world. The problem
is always the fact that by definition, 'Defence' - implies
waiting to react before responding to an attack. The
intimacy of electronic news gathering at nearly every
conflict around the world has had the effect that every
authority, be they police or military, has as much a
consideration to adverse publicity during conflicts
as they do to giving their people effective combat techniques.
Combative techniques cannot be 'politically correct'
and effective at the same time.
|
| Many
years ago, I began using the term 'Self Protection' to
free up the thinking and to acceptably allow pre-emptive
strikes to form the basis of my Close Combat teaching.
If we are looking, however, for a suitable heading to
describe the whole of what we want, then Unarmed Combat
becomes reasonably apt. The term does not condition us
to approach the subject with any particular mental limitations
and allows for free reign of techniques, both defensive
and offensive. My own problem with the head of 'Unarmed
Combat' is that we are actually seldom unarmed, even when
walking down the street, as we are likely to be carrying
pens, keys, matchbox, brolley, magazine and loose change,
all of which make good improvised weapons. Therefore,
if we free people from the thinking about 'Empty Hand'
concept, we then remove the constraints which restrict
us from thinking about a range of natural weapons which
can be brought into play, should occasion demand.
|
 |
|
I feel we get even closer to the
reality if we could call it 'Personal Combat'. I avoid
the term 'Close Quarter Battle' (CQB), as this, in military
terms is weapons oriented, although, as we know, the
battle is likely to be in an environment which places
the enemy close by and in a variety of concealed locations
from which they must be prised out - usually a 'built
up area'. The ideal term which I feel is most appropriate
is 'Close Quarter Combat' (CQC). It is suitably vague
to allow in whatever is appropriate at the time to suit
the demands placed on those who need to learn, such
as armed or unarmed techniques and in military personal
combat training, these demands have quite clearly seen
to pendulum in sync with the background of the state
of the nation i.e. at peace or at war.
At present, my personal belief is that no branch of
the military should be happy with their unarmed combat
syllabus, but it politically suits the times. Videos
I've watched and manuals I've studied, all reflect the
current imperative for a 'defensive' posture to be the
premise from which a syllabus has had to be designed.
You would need look no further than the 'committee
designed' army Restraint and Arrest manual. Essentially,
an adaptation of the Restraint Arrest and Control System
(RACS), developed by the army in co-operation with the
Army School of Physical Training, the Metropolitan Police
and HM Customs & Excise. By its own admission, the
syllabus was developed in 1970, primarily to meet the
army's peace-keeping role in Northern Ireland. "The
aim of the course is to give the solider effective,
but humane skills, whilst observing the principle of
minimum force consistent with achieving the objectives".
In other words, it won't work, but the authorities can
say they have one and it is hard to dispute that it
is effective. Its aims are broadly at odds with its
objectives and personal, bitter experience has taught
me that the 'supposed' attacks and holds perpetrated
by the illustrated attackers, bear no resemblance whatsoever
to how it happens in the real world. It is dangerous,
fallacious and misleading to train people in the belief
that these will work for only one person against real
attacks.
With excuses for dropping into the vernacular, its
complete bollocks to believe that someone, in reality,
who dives towards you with short, fast, slashing strokes
of a knife, can have his wrist gripped, twisted, locked
and then thrown to the ground and disarmed. When you
look at the diagrams in Control & Restraint, however,
the attackers are frozen into immobility for some 2
- 3 seconds after he has committed his arm for one thrust
of the knife at what must have been a pedestrian pace
- bollocks I say again - its not reality.
Capt. Stephen Stavers USMC, who was killed in 1944
during the marine landings at Peleliu, was a personal
combat instructor and a student of Col. Biddle, who
many will know from his somewhat classical work on the
subject of combat knife fighting. Stavers commented
on knife defence - he said (and knew) "that no
bare-handed disarming technique is dependable against
even a fair knife fighter. Trying to disarm a truly
scientific knife fighter would be like trying to stop
a propeller with bare hands". He went on to say
"indeed, the appearance of the scientific knife
fighter in action suggests a flashing propeller on the
head of a cobra, to use an extravagant metaphor, he
uses a slashing attack (rather than thrusting or stabbing),
with the knife pointing forward in a loose, flexible
manner, the blade flat and the cutting edge outward.
The blade is in constant, controlled, lateral motion
at the same time, moving in and out, high and low".
The above is the reality of it, not how you see it
portrayed in training manuals or martial arts magazines.
The myth is perpetuated by people who don't know - but
assume. To be fair to the Army's Physical Training Wing,
if commended to produce a manual - you do. This particular
work, however, is no better and no worse than any other
personal combat syllabus designed in peace-time than
it is when your country is at war - its just an image
problem and we come back to the necessity of authorities
to protect themselves and also to limit what they know
will eventually be in the hands of a civilian population.
During World War 2, FBI agents trained alongside the
first combined special forces of the American and Canadian
units, so that they knew what the soldiers knew. The
purpose of this was so they had equal combative skills
when these men returned to civilian life and would possibly
use their skills for more nefarious ends.
Contrast today's training with what we knew 80 years
ago when a man called William Ewatt Fairbairn walked
the streets of Shanghai. As an underage recruit, Fairbairn
had joined the Royal Marine's Light Infantry and in
1903 volunteered for duty with the British Legation
Guard at Seoul, Korea. In October that year, he sailed
for the Far East to begin an association with the Orient
which was to last until the late 1930s. Her arrived
in Korea in 1904, a few days before the outbreak of
the Russian-Japanese war and some seven years later,
bought his discharge and signed up as a constable in
the Shanghai Municipal Police.
The International Settlement, in Shanghai, for whose
safety, the SMP was responsible, was unquestionably,
at that time, the single most lawless place in the world,
with acts of crime and terrorism running at epidemic
levels. Organised gangs of professional kidnappers roamed
the streets armed with the latest in full and semi-auto
weapons and when caught, would use them. Conditions
in which the police fought were the filthy, tightly
packed, poorly lit, overcrowded maze of Chinese buildings,
against Chinese, Korean and Japanese gangsters skilled
in a variety of Martial Arts and the use of weapons.
The Queensbury rules and 'principles of marksmanship'
proved totally ineffective in combating such violence.
Fairbairn, with others, developed combat concepts and
training systems for pistol, knife, stick and unarmed
combat that, due to its success, was to eventually find
its way into all Commando training and for training
the special operations people in the British SOE (Special
Operations Executive) and the American OSS (Office of
Strategic Service) during the second world war as well
as the American Marine Corp. It was Fairbairn who thought
of the first 'Killing House' or 'Mystery House' as it
was called then. The system that formed the foundation
of their close combat was Defendu, the methods that
had been taught to members of the Shanghai Municipal
Police (SMP) and used to battle with the street gangs,
thugs, toughs, kidnappers and what have you that plagued
the International Settlement of Shanghai. One of the
largest criminal organisations that the world has seen,
plied their trade there. It was known as the Green Gang
and it is said that it had anywhere up to 100,000 members,
in and around the Shanghai area.
Defendu had been formulated and developed by W.E. Fairbairn
from his training in Shinnoshindo-Ryu Ju-Jitsu and his
later training in Kodokan judo. As well as these Japanese
arts, he also had a knowledge of wrestling, western
boxing, Savate, Chinese boxing and general brawling
methods used by a number of nationalities that resided
in or visited Shanghai. Add to this a study of the techniques
used by the United States Marine Corps, who had one
of their regiments stationed there from 1927 until 1942
and you will see a great depth of knowledge gained by
Fairbairn on all aspects of close combat, both armed
and unarmed.
All the methods espoused in Defendu had been used by
Fairbairn and members of the SMP. The real test came
in 1925 with the formation of what was officially known
as the Reserve Unit but better known as the Shanghai
Riot Squad. So it was from 1925 through to 1935, Fairbairn
trained, inspired and led the squad in all its various
duties. This covered street disturbances and riots,
armed robberies, kidnapping, hostage taking, siege situations
and a variety of bodyguarding duties. Until his retirement
at 55 years old, he took every opportunity to ride out
with his men on emergency calls. To illustrate this
- he retired at the end of February 1940 and yet in
the early part of the month, he was at siege, where
his unit had been sent to assist the local station in
which an armed gang had taken refuge and prisoners in
a residential area.
It would have been enough of a life for most people
up to this point, but we now enter really the third
part of an incredible life. In 1940, both he and E.A.
(Bill) Sykes, his partner in crime from the SMP, who
commanded the sniper unit, spent the war as Instructors
to Instructors for a variety of special forces and commando
units, both British, American and Canadian, as well
as the collection of foreign operatives who passed through
such establishments as Inverailort House, at Lochailort
in Scotland or the Commando Basic Training Centre (CBTC)
at Achnacarry House some 20 miles away. This article,
cannot devote itself to the history of these men or
their exploits and the forthcoming book by an old friend
and martial arts colleague, Peter Robins, on this truly
fascinating period of history and the Fairbairn-Sykes
line will satisfy this near forgotten piece of military
history and the story that needs to be told. What did
emerge from these men was a combat system which has,
for many, remained unequalled. They produced techniques
that worked against men versed in violence and death.
As we know, Fairbairn took every opportunity to accompany
as many patrols and call-outs so as to be able to assess
under fire and in combat, the reactions of himself and
his men. He knew what worked in the fear, stress, terror
and the reality of a gunfight and he adopted and developed
personal combat skills to suit. These reached their
peak in his 'Silent Killing Course' delivered at Lochailort
and elsewhere during the war years.
Peter Robins once wrote in an article how little development
work there was when one looked at Fairbairn's writings
in his books - Defendu 1926 Scientific Self Defence
1931 and finally, Get Tough. This wasn't by way of criticism,
but an observation about how few things actually worked
in real combat and about the simplicity of techniques
which are required. As the only genuine teacher of Defendu
in Britain, and with nearly 30 years martial arts experience,
Peter is more than qualified to comment on the role
of martial arts in self defence. The following is an
extract from an article he wrote for the internal newsletter
of The British Combat Association.
|
|
Thoughts on Self Protection
and Martial Arts
By Peter Robins
|
| "It is
indeed a sad reflection on the martial arts today that
so much of their original base in effective combat techniques
have been sacrificed and or lost in the myriad systems
that have evolved since the mass influx of these arts
into the West.
This is not to write all these
arts off, one cannot do this as there is always the
exception to the rule, but the rule seems to be that
hundreds of new systems and styles have been brought
into being in the last twenty years or so. The '60s
and '70s saw the mainstream systems, predominantly Japanese
Karate, grow and flourish. Gradually there began a break
up and split away of individuals and groups to found
their own organisations. No big problem there, but many
of these individuals and groups had little understanding
of their original system. Certainly in many cases, nowhere
near enough knowledge to go off and develop their own
system - style, yes, but actual system?
What happened was that in many
instances, the old adage 'a little learning is a dangerous
thing', was again proved true. Judged from a sporting
aspect, this break up was no big problem really. Judged
today from a self protection point of view, it was a
disaster. What we are left with is very often a hotch-potch
of sporting/competition moves, presented as a coherent
and sound method of self defence. Or a collection of
pseudo combat moves that are supposed to bear some notion
of reality. With some exceptions, nothing could be further
from the truth.
In too many cases we are left
with a motley collection of moves that in content, distance,
speed, timing, balance, power, tactically and strategically
would only work against an idiot moving at half speed.
This is fine for demonstration purposes and within the
confines of a dojo/training hall or someone's own little
mind cum fantasy world. If this is where it stayed,
there would be little harm done. But it does not. For
many years now, these kind of techniques have been presented
as a kind of mystical and magical potion to an unsuspecting
public. It would be marvellous to be able to say that
the type of training as described above would stand
one in good stead in a bad situation. Perhaps many years
ago it did, when few people knew better. Most attackers
twenty years ago, on seeing what they perceived as any
kind of martial arts prowess, would have run a mile.
Not so today. The bubble has burst. The dream has faded.
So where did it go wrong? At the
risk of being clever about this perplexing question,
these thoughts come to mind:-
|
|
I feel we get even closer to the
reality if we could call it 'Personal Combat'. I avoid
the term 'Close Quarter Battle' (CQB), as this, in military
terms is weapons oriented, although, as we know, the
battle is likely to be in an environment which places
the enemy close by and in a variety of concealed locations
from which they must be prised out - usually a 'built
up area'. The ideal term which I feel is most appropriate
is 'Close Quarter Combat' (CQC). It is suitably vague
to allow in whatever is appropriate at the time to suit
the demands placed on those who need to learn, such
as armed or unarmed techniques and in military personal
combat training, these demands have quite clearly seen
to pendulum in sync with the background of the state
of the nation i.e. at peace or at war.
At present, my personal belief is that no branch of
the military should be happy with their unarmed combat
syllabus, but it politically suits the times. Videos
I've watched and manuals I've studied, all reflect the
current imperative for a 'defensive' posture to be the
premise from which a syllabus has had to be designed.
You would need look no further than the 'committee
designed' army Restraint and Arrest manual. Essentially,
an adaptation of the Restraint Arrest and Control System
(RACS), developed by the army in co-operation with the
Army School of Physical Training, the Metropolitan Police
and HM Customs & Excise. By its own admission, the
syllabus was developed in 1970, primarily to meet the
army's peace-keeping role in Northern Ireland. "The
aim of the course is to give the solider effective,
but humane skills, whilst observing the principle of
minimum force consistent with achieving the objectives".
In other words, it won't work, but the authorities can
say they have one and it is hard to dispute that it
is effective. Its aims are broadly at odds with its
objectives and personal, bitter experience has taught
me that the 'supposed' attacks and holds perpetrated
by the illustrated attackers, bear no resemblance whatsoever
to how it happens in the real world. It is dangerous,
fallacious and misleading to train people in the belief
that these will work for only one person against real
attacks.
With excuses for dropping into the vernacular, its
complete bollocks to believe that someone, in reality,
who dives towards you with short, fast, slashing strokes
of a knife, can have his wrist gripped, twisted, locked
and then thrown to the ground and disarmed. When you
look at the diagrams in Control & Restraint, however,
the attackers are frozen into immobility for some 2
- 3 seconds after he has committed his arm for one thrust
of the knife at what must have been a pedestrian pace
- bollocks I say again - its not reality.
Capt. Stephen Stavers USMC, who was killed in 1944
during the marine landings at Peleliu, was a personal
combat instructor and a student of Col. Biddle, who
many will know from his somewhat classical work on the
subject of combat knife fighting. Stavers commented
on knife defence - he said (and knew) "that no
bare-handed disarming technique is dependable against
even a fair knife fighter. Trying to disarm a truly
scientific knife fighter would be like trying to stop
a propeller with bare hands". He went on to say
"indeed, the appearance of the scientific knife
fighter in action suggests a flashing propeller on the
head of a cobra, to use an extravagant metaphor, he
uses a slashing attack (rather than thrusting or stabbing),
with the knife pointing forward in a loose, flexible
manner, the blade flat and the cutting edge outward.
The blade is in constant, controlled, lateral motion
at the same time, moving in and out, high and low".
The above is the reality of it, not how you see it
portrayed in training manuals or martial arts magazines.
The myth is perpetuated by people who don't know - but
assume. To be fair to the Army's Physical Training Wing,
if commended to produce a manual - you do. This particular
work, however, is no better and no worse than any other
personal combat syllabus designed in peace-time than
it is when your country is at war - its just an image
problem and we come back to the necessity of authorities
to protect themselves and also to limit what they know
will eventually be in the hands of a civilian population.
During World War 2, FBI agents trained alongside the
first combined special forces of the American and Canadian
units, so that they knew what the soldiers knew. The
purpose of this was so they had equal combative skills
when these men returned to civilian life and would possibly
use their skills for more nefarious ends.
Contrast today's training with what we knew 80 years
ago when a man called William Ewatt Fairbairn walked
the streets of Shanghai. As an underage recruit, Fairbairn
had joined the Royal Marine's Light Infantry and in
1903 volunteered for duty with the British Legation
Guard at Seoul, Korea. In October that year, he sailed
for the Far East to begin an association with the Orient
which was to last until the late 1930s. Her arrived
in Korea in 1904, a few days before the outbreak of
the Russian-Japanese war and some seven years later,
bought his discharge and signed up as a constable in
the Shanghai Municipal Police.
The International Settlement, in Shanghai, for whose
safety, the SMP was responsible, was unquestionably,
at that time, the single most lawless place in the world,
with acts of crime and terrorism running at epidemic
levels. Organised gangs of professional kidnappers roamed
the streets armed with the latest in full and semi-auto
weapons and when caught, would use them. Conditions
in which the police fought were the filthy, tightly
packed, poorly lit, overcrowded maze of Chinese buildings,
against Chinese, Korean and Japanese gangsters skilled
in a variety of Martial Arts and the use of weapons.
The Queensbury rules and 'principles of marksmanship'
proved totally ineffective in combating such violence.
Fairbairn, with others, developed combat concepts and
training systems for pistol, knife, stick and unarmed
combat that, due to its success, was to eventually find
its way into all Commando training and for training
the special operations people in the British SOE (Special
Operations Executive) and the American OSS (Office of
Strategic Service) during the second world war as well
as the American Marine Corp. It was Fairbairn who thought
of the first 'Killing House' or 'Mystery House' as it
was called then. The system that formed the foundation
of their close combat was Defendu, the methods that
had been taught to members of the Shanghai Municipal
Police (SMP) and used to battle with the street gangs,
thugs, toughs, kidnappers and what have you that plagued
the International Settlement of Shanghai. One of the
largest criminal organisations that the world has seen,
plied their trade there. It was known as the Green Gang
and it is said that it had anywhere up to 100,000 members,
in and around the Shanghai area.
Defendu had been formulated and developed by W.E. Fairbairn
from his training in Shinnoshindo-Ryu Ju-Jitsu and his
later training in Kodokan judo. As well as these Japanese
arts, he also had a knowledge of wrestling, western
boxing, Savate, Chinese boxing and general brawling
methods used by a number of nationalities that resided
in or visited Shanghai. Add to this a study of the techniques
used by the United States Marine Corps, who had one
of their regiments stationed there from 1927 until 1942
and you will see a great depth of knowledge gained by
Fairbairn on all aspects of close combat, both armed
and unarmed.
All the methods espoused in Defendu had been used by
Fairbairn and members of the SMP. The real test came
in 1925 with the formation of what was officially known
as the Reserve Unit but better known as the Shanghai
Riot Squad. So it was from 1925 through to 1935, Fairbairn
trained, inspired and led the squad in all its various
duties. This covered street disturbances and riots,
armed robberies, kidnapping, hostage taking, siege situations
and a variety of bodyguarding duties. Until his retirement
at 55 years old, he took every opportunity to ride out
with his men on emergency calls. To illustrate this
- he retired at the end of February 1940 and yet in
the early part of the month, he was at siege, where
his unit had been sent to assist the local station in
which an armed gang had taken refuge and prisoners in
a residential area.
It would have been enough of a life for most people
up to this point, but we now enter really the third
part of an incredible life. In 1940, both he and E.A.
(Bill) Sykes, his partner in crime from the SMP, who
commanded the sniper unit, spent the war as Instructors
to Instructors for a variety of special forces and commando
units, both British, American and Canadian, as well
as the collection of foreign operatives who passed through
such establishments as Inverailort House, at Lochailort
in Scotland or the Commando Basic Training Centre (CBTC)
at Achnacarry House some 20 miles away. This article,
cannot devote itself to the history of these men or
their exploits and the forthcoming book by an old friend
and martial arts colleague, Peter Robins, on this truly
fascinating period of history and the Fairbairn-Sykes
line will satisfy this near forgotten piece of military
history and the story that needs to be told. What did
emerge from these men was a combat system which has,
for many, remained unequalled. They produced techniques
that worked against men versed in violence and death.
As we know, Fairbairn took every opportunity to accompany
as many patrols and call-outs so as to be able to assess
under fire and in combat, the reactions of himself and
his men. He knew what worked in the fear, stress, terror
and the reality of a gunfight and he adopted and developed
personal combat skills to suit. These reached their
peak in his 'Silent Killing Course' delivered at Lochailort
and elsewhere during the war years.
Peter Robins once wrote in an article how little development
work there was when one looked at Fairbairn's writings
in his books - Defendu 1926 Scientific Self Defence
1931 and finally, Get Tough. This wasn't by way of criticism,
but an observation about how few things actually worked
in real combat and about the simplicity of techniques
which are required. As the only genuine teacher of Defendu
in Britain, and with nearly 30 years martial arts experience,
Peter is more than qualified to comment on the role
of martial arts in self defence. The following is an
extract from an article he wrote for the internal newsletter
of The British Combat Association.
|
|
Thoughts on Self Protection
and Martial Arts
By Peter Robins
|
| "It is
indeed a sad reflection on the martial arts today that
so much of their original base in effective combat techniques
have been sacrificed and or lost in the myriad systems
that have evolved since the mass influx of these arts
into the West.
This is not to write all these
arts off, one cannot do this as there is always the
exception to the rule, but the rule seems to be that
hundreds of new systems and styles have been brought
into being in the last twenty years or so. The '60s
and '70s saw the mainstream systems, predominantly Japanese
Karate, grow and flourish. Gradually there began a break
up and split away of individuals and groups to found
their own organisations. No big problem there, but many
of these individuals and groups had little understanding
of their original system. Certainly in many cases, nowhere
near enough knowledge to go off and develop their own
system - style, yes, but actual system?
What happened was that in many
instances, the old adage 'a little learning is a dangerous
thing', was again proved true. Judged from a sporting
aspect, this break up was no big problem really. Judged
today from a self protection point of view, it was a
disaster. What we are left with is very often a hotch-potch
of sporting/competition moves, presented as a coherent
and sound method of self defence. Or a collection of
pseudo combat moves that are supposed to bear some notion
of reality. With some exceptions, nothing could be further
from the truth.
In too many cases we are left
with a motley collection of moves that in content, distance,
speed, timing, balance, power, tactically and strategically
would only work against an idiot moving at half speed.
This is fine for demonstration purposes and within the
confines of a dojo/training hall or someone's own little
mind cum fantasy world. If this is where it stayed,
there would be little harm done. But it does not. For
many years now, these kind of techniques have been presented
as a kind of mystical and magical potion to an unsuspecting
public. It would be marvellous to be able to say that
the type of training as described above would stand
one in good stead in a bad situation. Perhaps many years
ago it did, when few people knew better. Most attackers
twenty years ago, on seeing what they perceived as any
kind of martial arts prowess, would have run a mile.
Not so today. The bubble has burst. The dream has faded.
So where did it go wrong? At the
risk of being clever about this perplexing question,
these thoughts come to mind:-
|
- The myth was sold that all and any martial arts
training was effective.
- The myth was sold that a black belt automatically
meant that you have become an instructor, when all
it really meant was that the recipient had gained
a certain level in training.
- The myth was sold that gaining in knowledge and
becoming effective meant
- learning more weird and wonderful moves as you progressed.
- The myth was sold that all martial arts had been
tried and tested.
|
|
The
list could go on, but we will stop there and state that
this is enough to be going on with!
Pick up any martial arts magazine
from the past few years and you will see words used
in the text and advertisements that were never used
before - words like, real, effective, practical, combat
..
This is not done just for editorial
content. It does show that a problem has been recognised
in regard to what has been passed off for self protection
and what has often been a rather stylised dance or keep
fit regime. Harsh words? Maybe so. I truly hope that
anyone reading this can turn around and say - "that
does not apply to me, I had a good instructor, one that
knew what he was talking about at a practical level
and made what he gave us a living art, not a dead artefact".
Consider this, you have been told
that you are at war from tomorrow and that you have
been given a group of people to train. They will be
able to spend about a day or two with you learning some
unarmed techniques, after that they will have to move
on and take with them what you have been able to show
them. They might very well have to use what you have
been able to teach them in a real close combat situation
.. what would you teach them? Now you may say
this sounds rather far-fetched, but travel back to the
last war and that is more or less what instructors like
Fairbairn & Sykes had to do.
Peter Robins advises that Fairbairn
based his teaching of close combat on 3 principles:-
|
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Surprise ---- Speed --- Retaining
the Initiative
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The first two are self-explanatory, the third perhaps
not quite so. What he advocated was that once you decide
you have to attack, then there is no let-up until the
fight is over. The rationale was very aptly summed up
by the CO at the Special Training Centre, Lochailort,
in Western Scotland in July 1942 as follows:-
"To the civilian without a weapon, or the soldier
surprised without his or deprived of it, it gives the
necessary confidence, determination and ruthlessness
to gain victory. It will soon be found that the principle
value of the training lies not so much in the actual
physical holds or breaks (and blows), but in the psychological
reaction which engenders and fosters the necessary attitude
of mind which refuses to admit defeat and is determined
to achieve victory".
Starting from the STC, their methods spread wide and
far, found their way into the Army, Navy, Royal Marines
and RAF, to say nothing of the many special units that
Great Britain formed. Some are well known, such as the
Commandos, Independent Companies, Special Operations
Executive (SOE), SAS, SBS, with their links extending
to all United States and Canadian special forces and
intelligence operations. Fairbairn taught such worthy
notables in unconventional warfare as Spencer Chapman,
Mike Calvert, Lord Lovat an both the Stirling brothers,
not to mention Randolph Churchull and Ian Fleming.
Broadly, the foundation of a close combat system should
be based on these precepts:-
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- Easy
to present
- Easy to understand
- Easy to perform
- Easy to retain under stress
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To
be accurate, the term 'relatively easy' should be substituted
for easy, as no system will ever be that easy to put
over in a combat situation, as the resultant stress
induced sees to that. During his interviews with former
CBTC instructors in his quest for information on the
period, Peter Robins tells the story of his encounter
with a 73 year old. They were talking about the wristlock,
which if you look in Fairbairn's book, never seems a
particularly dynamic technique. Peter's next recollection,
however, was from his back as he looked up at the boot
of this old man which was just inches from his face.
He'd actually carried out an attack on Peter with the
technique, put him down - with no compliance from Peter
whatsoever - and as Peter tells the story, there was
nothing he could have done about it.
What then became patently clear
to Peter about the difference then and now, was that
the philosophy of combat was based on attack. What Peter
had perceived in the book as a passive defence, was
in fact an attacking move and this has since been confirmed
by numerous people who went through Lochailort as instructors.
The imperatives of war demanded deadly, effective, pre-emptive
action. Today, regrettably, it is wait, defend and die
or suffer serious injury. Prior to Lochailort and the
Fairbairn/Sykes influence, older instructors from the
physical training wing, whose responsibility, hand to
hand combat, had been confirmed that the whole emphasis
had changed from Defence to Attack.
Any army manual for combat which
has been contributed to by the Met and Customs &
Excise, is not forged in either the heat of war or the
necessity of survival, but coloured with the brush of
political correctness and over-adherence to the laws
of self defence. Watch any Sky television programme
on American police to see the reality of personal combat.
I watched the arrest, by hardened, experienced officers,
of a drugged individual who had the potential to cause
harm and injury. When eventually he was taken, it was
by 5 to 6 officers and the two who first got there knew
that they would be unable to subdue him on their own,
without serious risk of personal injuries. It takes
numbers of people to restrain someone who is only partially
violent and those same officers would die laughing if
they could look at how our British Control & Restraint
training has been put together and sold to individual
police and prison officers. Over the past few years
however, this has all changed and a 'Wind of Change'
is blowing through police training in the UK.
Attack was only ever the best
means of defence - and remains so. Later we will look
at techniques, but for the moment, we need to stay with
some broad concepts of combat. It isn't actually the
techniques which win the day, it's what behind them
that count. The techniques are just the tip of the iceberg
and to use an analogy, it wasn't what they could see
of the iceberg that sank the Titanic, rather it was
the large mass which went unseen below the waves. My
approach to this has been through my own development
of FRAME:
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F actors
R ange
A ssessment
M ethod
E xecution
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above are headings which we will look and which contain
the massive amount of data which we should have before
we act in combat. These are not awareness factors, they
are all the other things that regrettably we ignore or
take for granted, but which have substantial influence
of whether we have the whole picture and will succeed
in our endeavour.
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FACTORS
How dressed (you), terrain,
footwear, lighting, natural weapon, escape routes, enemy
territory, friendly forces (help), PURPOSE, witnesses.
These are the 'situational' factors that are often ignored
when combat techniques are shown in manuals. The typical
military training video has 2 men squared off in a guard
position, where one man has a weapon and the other looks
suitably ready. To this day, I haven't a ----ing clue
as to where the assailant was supposed to have appeared
from, other than to assume he just materialised out
of thin air.
Whilst all of the factors mentioned
above require consideration, 'Purpose' demands a more
detailed examination If, for example, you are a police
officer, chasing on foot a known, violent felon, who
was surprised during a hold-up and who took off, you
would have no doubt in your mind as to your purpose
- essentially, in this case, your purpose is your occupation.
You might not verbally express it at the time, but it
could be summarised as 'a desire to arrest the suspect',
but probably a 'stronger desire to survive the experience'.
You are in little doubt as to your purpose and you would
be in little doubt as to the other's purpose if, during
the chase, he had hidden and then without warning, sprang
out in front of you, armed with a knife and attacked.
Contrast this with a civilian
walking the same route when the same thing happens i.e.
a person explodes from behind a street corner or doorway
and attacks you with a knife. In this instance, his
purpose is blindingly clear and yours less so - you
have still to come to terms with your purpose, which,
if you have the time to recover your surprise, should
be to flee.
An even less clear distinction
is in this scenario where, as you are walking along
the same street, a person who you would describe as
'suspicious', emerges from a doorway, fixes his eyes
on you and comes towards you with one hand seemingly
holding something in his pocket. Now both his purpose
and yours is completely unclear. You want to suspect
the best not the worst, you will refrain from an attack
to pre-empt the threatening situation and you will be
caught still trying to make your assessment of the situation
when he eventually closes and makes an attack. He may,
of course, run past, take the change out of his pocket
and jump on the bus he was looking at over your shoulder
- paranoia or preparedness?
It doesn't really matter so long
as you avoid the classic 'FREEZE' - this happens because
of being surprised and being unable to determine your
PURPOSE i.e. your role in what is happening around you.
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RANGE
This section is very much
'AWARENESS' based. Awareness of risk or threat 'buys'
time! - The further out we perceive a possible threat,
the more time we have for our assessment and fight or
flight. In 'The Modern Bodyguard', I've put some flesh
on the bones of my principles of Self Protection, which
is the Awareness Pyramid:-
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AVOIDANCE
EVALUATION
AWARENESS
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In
this article, I don't want to re-visit this concept
in depth, nor the 'action trigger' to substitute for
decision-making, save to say the 'FRAME' commonly happens
against a background of 'AWARENESS' - without it there
is just shock, surprise and, as they say in the movies
'a world of pain'.
Under the heading of 'RANGE',
we obviously take in the actual distance, but also closing
speed, angle of approach and weapons range. Remember,
an Olympic-standard sprinter is covering 100m in under
10 seconds - to cover 10m? - well work it out for yourself.
For those readers who are familiar with 'Surviving Edged
Weapons', you will know that the safe! 'control distance'
for an armed officer to deal with a 'knife wielding'
assailant is out to 21 feet - At 2.1 ft you're as good
as cut - Act before.
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ASSESSMENT
Opponent - size, build, aggressive,
demeanour, body language, numbers, + the 3D's - drunk,
drugged and dressed. Clothing can be like body armour
- the more layers someone is wearing, the harder they
are to hurt. A 20 stone, well built attacker, wearing
a vest, 1 shirt, 1 woolly pully, a jacket and overcoat,
who's had 12 pints of Guinness, is going to be hard
to hurt with bodyshots!
ASSESSMENT = DECISION
TIME
This is where PURPOSE should be clearly decided - both
yours and his - don't remain under any doubt at this
stage as to whether you have a problem or not - if in
doubt Front Him or Turn and Get Out of There! You can't
afford to wait until the distance is closed and he's
on you.
METHOD
The psychology of conflict. The battle takes place well
before any physical exchange. Simply making resolute
eye contact can warn an intending mugger that you've
seen him - once the element of surprise is lost, they
will lose interest in you.
Method is also about 'acting'. You have a number of
choices to make at this stage depending upon your assessment.
You may be aware of one person, but muggers seldom come
in ones. What can start as a 'one to one', can end up
with you battling against 2 - 3. So - BE
CERTAIN.
If conflict is inevitable, then you need to be a good
poker player, as you may have to bluff, despite your
inner feelings. You can exude aggression and even verbalise
this in a torrent of powerful invective. If you're not
up to that and you don't have a face like a robber's
dog - (which helps with the bluff) - don't attempt it.
Better to appear afraid and incapable, which subterfuge
can build over-confidence in your opponent and serve
to draw him in to your most suitable and preferred range.
You need to practise both these postures and the dialogue
which goes with them - they both work and have for me
on many occasions.
The aggressive approach will, however, seldom work
on drunks, or people whose rational thinking is affected
by drugs or a complete loss of self-control and anger.
Their imagination, as to what will befall them, that
you're so graphically describing, is lost on these people
- though it can work well with the casual street 'encounter'.
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EXECUTION
The Fight or Flight.
Such facets as mental domination, attitude not to give
up, the 'win' mentality, Action Triggers.
What you do if there
is to be combat, do you punch, kick, throw, strangle,
choke, lock or do you run?
For Execution, substitute
Explosion, which is what you must do. It should be over
in a split second. I teach 'Attack' - Wellington, when
asked about his tactics in battle replied (with apologies
for what he might actually have said) - "I have
no tactics, I simply join the enemy and then decide
what I'm going to do".
Distance
- Dilutes! By this I mean that doing techniques at a
distance dilutes power and impact. You must be close
to your opponent to gain most effect from natural bodyweight
put into techniques. The main features of Execution
are the weapons as we have said hands! Feet! Combinations!
Takedowns! Etc etc.
FRAME
is just that - a Framework around which all aspects
of a confrontation can be positioned and assessed. In
Close Protection, for example, when we are in possession
of all the facts about a job, we make an 'appreciation'
and it's the same in CQC. It demands, at the risk of
repetition, that you are constantly aware as to how
all the factors under each heading are constantly changing
- i.e. 'Situation Awareness' and how, as a consequence,
our options and methods need to change.
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